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The expulsion of entire populations from their native lands because of their ethnic-
ity is a practice probably as old as humankind itself. From the nineteenth century 
onwards, however, although the appropriation of arable land and houses remained 
a major incentive, the removal of ethnic groups occurred for ‘modern’ reasons. Na-
tionalism had become the main motivation, or at least a commonly accepted ratio-
nalization.
Gellner (1993, p. 1) defines nationalism as ‘primarily a political principle, which 
holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’. This implies that 
all members of the nation—which in Eastern Europe, as a rule, is an ethnic nation—
should live within the borders of their own nation state. A corollary of nationalism is 
irredentism, a foreign policy that aims at incorporating within the national territory 
any adjacent areas that are populated—if only partly—by co-ethnics. The ‘con-
gruence’ of nation and state also supposes an ethnically homogeneous population 
within the state’s borders: ethnic groups differing from the dominant one are re-
moved through assimilation, ethnic cleansing (a particular variant of which appears 
to be population exchanges), and—in extreme circumstances—genocide. With the 
nationalist state concept prevailing, minority rights are given reluctantly.
Irredentism and the (mis)treatment of minorities are interdependent in yet an-
other way: a policy aiming at the elimination of minorities is often inspired by 
the fear of irredentist aggression on the part of the neighbouring state(s), while 
steps taken to eliminate the minority enhance the irredentism of the neighbouring 
state(s)—now presented as a protective measure—rather than diminish it. The as-
signment of minorities’ rights is facilitated, or complicated, if both states contain 
minorities of each other’s populations, in which case the minorities are treated more 
or less as hostages or potential objects for bargaining. In a similar way, refugees 
after having found shelter in their ‘own’ nation state, are often instrumentalized by 
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the governments of these states to support claims on parts of the territory of the state 
from which the refugees were expelled.
After World War I, population exchanges were generally considered to be an 
appropriate way to ethnically homogenize a population, to eliminate problems of 
minorities, and to avoid territorial conflicts. From the point of view of political sci-
ence, international relations, and diplomacy, population exchanges in a number of 
instances did indeed substantially contribute to improved relations between states, 
as they removed at least the ethnic component of territorial conflicts.1
However, the idea that a lost territory was originally inhabited by ‘our people’ 
has continued to incite strong emotions of being wronged and to increase the sup-
port of ‘revanchist’ and ‘revisionist’ parties which have often been tempted to stir 
them up whenever induced by domestic or international political threats or oppor-
tunities.
This chapter investigates some aspects of how within Bulgaria in the interwar 
period, in spite of all sincere human concerns about the deplorable fate of the refu-
gees, the ‘refugees question’ ( bežanskijat văpros) was (ab)used in order to serve an 
irredentist and revisionist foreign policy that met nationalist aspirations rather than 
the refugees’ real needs. In Bulgaria, owing to the harsh treatment meted out at the 
Paris Peace Conference (Treaty of Neuilly) in 1919, nationalist frustrations and re-
vanchism were particularly strong. Nevertheless, Bulgaria was not an isolated case. 
Similar emotions existed, for instance, in Greece concerning Northern Epirus and in 
Albania concerning Kosovo. After depicting Bulgaria’s national frustrations about 
the territories it lost or failed to acquire and the massive influx of refugees from 
these territories, this chapter proceeds to examine the strategies that subsequent 
Bulgarian governments, instrumentalizing the refugees and their organizations, ap-
plied to undo the suffered injustices.
3.1  Early Population Exchanges
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, forced migrations often occurred with 
the consent, or even insistence, of what we are now used to calling ‘the international 
community’, that is, the Great Powers or respected international organizations. Af-
ter World War I, the League of Nations monitored implementation of not only mi-
norities’ rights, but also treaties and conventions concerning population exchanges.
1 Currently, international law experts, economists, sociologists, and anthropologists are more 
sceptical about the benefits of population exchanges. Evidently, from a moral perspective, nowa-
days they are totally unacceptable. Population exchanges cause immense suffering not only be-
cause people had to leave their native lands where their ancestors were buried, along with loss of 
immovable properties and most of their belongings, but also because their adaptation to a new 
and often hostile environment was a traumatizing experience (see e.g. Clark 2006 and the ‘assess-
ments of Lausanne’ in Hirschon 2004, pp. 9–12; for the legal aspects of population exchanges, see 
Barutčiski, ‘Lausanne Revisited’ in the same volume).
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In the Southern Balkans, there were three major such population exchange 
agreements: the Treaty of Constantinople (1913) between Bulgaria and the Ottoman 
Empire (never fully implemented), the Convention between Bulgaria and Greece 
Respecting Reciprocal Emigration of Minorities of 27 November 1919 (signed at 
the same time as the Neuilly Treaty), and the Convention Concerning the Exchange 
of Greek and Turkish Populations added to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. As a re-
sult of ethnic cleansing and bilateral agreements in Macedonia and Thrace—the re-
gions focused on in this chapter—during the period 1912–1924, large-scale demo-
graphic transformations occurred in what is now Greek Macedonia. On the eve of 
the Balkan Wars, the number of Bulgarians amounted to 119,000; after the Balkan 
Wars, 104,000 Bulgarians were left, further declining to 77,000 between 1920 and 
1924. The number of Greeks increased from 513,000 to 1,277,000 over the period 
1912–1924. In Western Thrace, the number of Bulgarians over the same period 
declined from 35,000 to 23,000, while the number of Greeks grew from 87,000 to 
reach 189,000. Finally, in Eastern Thrace the entire Greek population of 235,000 
people disappeared and the number of Bulgarians shrank from 50,000 to 1,000. The 
fate of the Muslim population was even worse: the number of Muslims (Turks and 
Pomaks) in (Greek) Macedonia was reduced from 475,000 to 2,000 and in Western 
Thrace from 111,000 to 84,000; in Eastern Thrace the number of Muslims grew 
from 223,000 to 370,000.2
The economic and social disruption and human tragedies caused by these co-
erced demographic changes were all the more painful as Macedonia and Thrace al-
ready had a history of ethnic cleansing. By the time of the Russian-Ottoman War of 
1877–1878 (known in Bulgaria as the War of Liberation), more than half a million 
Turks had been expelled not only from the Principality of Bulgaria, but also from 
the Ottoman autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia, both created by the 1878 
Treaty of Berlin (McCarthy 2001, p. 48). Although the Treaty envisaged the return 
of the refugees, covertly the temporary Russian administration and the Bulgarian 
authorities tried hard to prevent their homecoming. The aim was twofold—ethnic 
homogenization and appropriation of real estate (Statelova 1983, p. 126). From the 
areas that had remained under Ottoman rule after the war (Macedonia and the south-
ern and eastern parts of Thrace), a limited number of Bulgarians—mainly intellec-
tuals—emigrated to independent Bulgaria. However, they thought of themselves as 
political activists in exile rather than as refugees. The suppression of the 1903 Ilin-
den Insurrection in what is now the Republic of Macedonia resulted in the emigra-
tion to Bulgaria of about 30,000 people, fearing Ottoman retaliations (Dragostinova 
2 See Pallis (1925). The numbers are cited here merely to give an idea of the magnitude of the de-
mographic change: like all Balkan statistics, they are potentially controversial. As a rule, Orthodox 
Christians belonging to the Bulgarian Exarchate are considered to be Bulgarians, and Orthodox 
Christians belonging to the Patriarchate of Constantinople are classified as Greeks, although these 
categories are not entirely congruent. In addition, Bulgarians in Macedonia are now regarded as 
Macedonians by many historians. In the period under consideration, however, they are most often 
recorded as Bulgarians (e.g., in Pallis’ study, in the Carnegie Report (Carnegie 1914), and else-
where. Since we intend only to give an idea of the size of these migrations, we do not take into 
consideration smaller ethnic groups such as Armenians, Jews, and Vlachs.
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2006, p. 553). The Greek population in Bulgaria, living predominantly on the Black 
Sea coast in the cities of Plovdiv (Philippopolis) and Asenovgrad (Stenimachos) 
and the surrounding villages, was discriminated against and harassed from the very 
beginning of the existence of the Bulgarian state (Nazărska 1999)—although this 
was no more serious than that experienced by ethnic minorities in other Balkan 
countries. In 1906, the Greek population in Burgas, Pomorie (Anchialos), and in 
other coastal cities fell victim to a pogrom, intended as retaliation for Greek attacks 
on Bulgarian villages in Macedonia (Avramov 2009).
During the First Balkan War (1912–1913), all belligerents (Bulgaria, Greece, 
Montenegro, and Serbia) embarked on ethnic cleansing of the Muslim populations 
(Turkish, Albanian, and Pomak) in the conquered areas of the Ottoman Empire: 
87,000 of the 2,315,000 living there were expelled (McCarthy 2001, p. 92). During 
the Second Balkan War (1913), the newly-formed alliance (Greece, Montenegro, 
and Serbia, now joined by Romania and the Ottoman Empire) against Bulgaria 
targeted mainly the Bulgarian population in the territories they occupied. In Eastern 
Thrace about one third of the Bulgarian population was massacred by the Ottoman 
army (Dragostinova 2006, p. 553). The Treaty of Constantinople between Bulgaria 
and the Ottoman Empire, of September 1913, provided for a mutual exchange of the 
Bulgarian and Turkish populations within a 50 km zone on both sides of the border, 
but it was not implemented because of the outbreak of World War I.
The expulsions did not stop after August 1913 when the Treaty of Bucharest was 
signed, concluding the Second Balkan War. Although no clause envisaging a popu-
lation exchange was included in the treaty, the expulsions eventually took the char-
acter of a de facto population exchange. The Bulgarian authorities forced Greeks 
and Turks in the areas under Bulgarian rule—the Pirin region of Macedonia and 
especially Western Thrace—to emigrate. On the other hand, many Bulgarians had 
to leave the Southern Dobrudža, assigned to Romania, and Eastern Thrace, which 
was reincorporated into the remnants of the Ottoman Empire.3 Smaller numbers of 
Bulgarians from Greek (or Aegean) and Serbian (or Vardar) Macedonia also kept 
on arriving.
As most of the refugees considered their stay in Bulgaria to be temporary, they 
preferred to establish themselves in proximity to the areas they had abandoned—
along the borders, in the Pirin region of Macedonia, around the city of Petrič, and in 
Western Thrace (Dragostinova 2006, p. 557). The Bulgarian authorities gave them 
shelter in the houses left by the expelled Greeks and Turks. There is no doubt that 
the establishment of the refugees in the border zone also served the strategic aim 
of creating an overwhelmingly Bulgarian population in these vulnerable areas. As 
Dragostinova (2006, p. 558) points out, ‘while bureaucrats rationalized such deci-
sions with the urgency to secure land for the refugees, no doubt these policies aimed 
3 The May 1913 Treaty of London, concluding the First Balkan War, had fixed the western border 
of the Ottoman Empire along the line Enoz-Midye, ceding most of Western Thrace to Bulgaria. 
With the Treaty of Bucharest, the Ottoman Empire re-acquired eastern Thrace as far as Edirne in 
the north and the River Marica (Evros, Meriç) in the south.
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at ridding strategic territories (especially the Burgas and Kărdžali areas near the 
Turkish and Greek borders) of distrustful ethnic and religious minorities’.
Although Bulgaria, like the other Balkan nations, was reluctant to engage in 
a new military conflict, ultimately the opportunity offered by the Central Powers 
to revise the ‘injustices’ imposed by the Treaty of Bucharest turned out to be ir-
resistible for a frustrated irredentist nation. In 1915, Bulgaria occupied Southern 
Dobrudža and Serbia (the region of Niš, Kosovo, and Macedonia). This new state 
of affairs allowed for the return of many of the refugees to their native lands. The 
persecutions of the local (non-Bulgarian) population, in which the squads of the 
Internal Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organization (IMARO) had a 
large role, resulted not only from an irredentist policy, but also from the revenge-
fulness of the expelled and returned populations. Irredentist aspirations, frustration 
about lost properties and sorrow for the victims were feelings that would reinforce 
one another for years to come.4
3.2  Demographic Consequences of World War I  
and the Peace Settlements
The war ended in a catastrophe for Bulgaria’s allies and consequently for Bul-
garia. The Macedonian front was broken, and the Bulgarian army had to retire to 
the North. The territories that Bulgaria had annexed during the war now had to be 
evacuated. Western Thrace, occupied by British and French forces, remained under 
the control of the Entente Powers. Bulgaria risked losing this area, which was eco-
nomically of the utmost importance because of the profitable tobacco culture and, 
especially, because of the harbour of Dede Ağaç (Alexandroupolis), which provided 
the country an outlet to the Mediterranean.
At the peace conference in Paris, Bulgaria was treated harshly. The Treaty of 
Neuilly, signed on 27 November 1919, forced Bulgaria not only to renounce the 
territories occupied during the war, but also to cede four small areas on its western 
border to the newly-formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (after 1929, 
Yugoslavia). The treaty came with the Convention between Bulgaria and Greece 
Respecting Reciprocal Emigration of Minorities, which introduced the first large-
scale population exchange in the Balkans. About 35,000 Greeks left Bulgaria for 
Greece, reducing the Greek presence in Bulgaria from 1.0 to 0.1 %. Depending 
on sources, between 42,000 and 66,000 Bulgarians, mainly from Greek Eastern 
Macedonia, emigrated to Bulgaria—joining the much larger number of Bulgarian 
4 The Internal Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organization (IMARO) fought for the 
liberation and annexation to Bulgaria of Macedonia and ‘the region of Adrianople’, which meant 
Thrace. In 1919, it was transformed into the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(IMRO).
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refugees from Yugoslav Macedonia.5 The Treaty of Neuilly stipulated that Bulgaria 
cede Western Thrace to the Entente Powers, which administered it as a protector-
ate in anticipation of a final decision on its status. After the Entente Powers had 
entrusted the administration of Western Thrace to Greece, harassment by Greek of-
ficials forced Bulgarians—many of them for the second time—to flee and look for 
shelter in Bulgaria. The 1920 Conference of San Remo assigned Western Thrace to 
Greece. Subsequently, most of the Bulgarians in Western Thrace left for Bulgaria.
In addition to the territorial losses, Bulgaria had to pay huge reparations to 
Greece and Yugoslavia. Moreover, it was not allowed to have a proper army, and it 
was kept in diplomatic isolation as a country suspected (with good reason) of pursu-
ing a revisionist foreign policy. A number of practicalities, including an agreement 
on the protection of the cultural rights of the ‘Slavophone’ population in Greece 
and its monitoring by the League of Nations, were settled in the September 1924 
Kalfov-Politis Agreement (named after both countries’ ministers of foreign affairs). 
The Greek parliament, however, did not ratify the agreement. The December 1927 
Mollov-Kafandaris Agreement, endorsed by the League of Nations in January 
1928, regulated the financial aspects of the expropriation of Bulgarian immovable 
properties in Greece and Greek immovable properties in Bulgaria. It led to a new, 
last wave of emigrants, mainly from Greece to Bulgaria.
All together, in the period from October 1912 to December 1926, the Bulgar-
ian authorities officially recognized 253,067 people as refugees. Together with the 
refugees who left Macedonia after the Ilinden Insurrection and those who for some 
reason were not officially recognized as refugees, their total amounted to 280,000.6 
Some 48 % of them originated from Greece (Aegean Macedonia, and Western 
Thrace), 28 % from the Ottoman Empire (Eastern Thrace, and Asia Minor), 12.5 % 
from Yugoslavia (Vardar Macedonia and the western districts) and 11 % from Ro-
mania (Southern Dobrudža) (Dragostinova 2006, p. 553). Given the huge number 
of casualties in the Balkan Wars and World War I, the territories lost after the wars, 
the economic and social consequences of the massive immigration of refugees, 
and the psychological impact of the military defeat, the Bulgarian qualification of 
the events as a ‘national catastrophe’ seems justified. The strong feeling of being 
wronged explains to a large extent the way Bulgarian governments dealt with the 
refugees: they were to help to undo the injustices that the nation had suffered, the 
more so as they were directly involved.
5 According to Poulton (1995, p. 86), between 52,000 and 72,000 Slavs, depending on the source, 
emigrated from Greece to Bulgaria. Kofos (1964, p. 27) writes that only 42,000 Slav Macedonians 
left Greece between 1912 and 1926. According to figures produced by the League of Nations, 
quoted by Lithoxoou (1992, p. 60), no fewer than 66,132 Slavs emigrated to Bulgaria only as a 
result of the Convention (that means from 1920 onwards).
6 The refugees were registered with the aim of obtaining a foreign loan and their number might 
therefore be inflated. Aleksandăr Cankov, who was prime minister from 1923 to 1926 and must 
have been well informed, claims that ‘for propaganda reasons, the number of refugees was greatly 
exaggerated. Actually, their number was between 50,000 and 60,000’ (Cankov n.d., p. 321). How-
ever, as he personally was not in favour of a foreign loan, and moreover his successor and rival 
Andrej Ljapčev was credited with having obtained the loan, Cankov probably deliberately under-
estimated the numbers.
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3.3  Instrumentalizing the Refugees
The Bulgarian authorities from the very beginning (that is, from the Second Bal-
kan War onwards) ‘used’ their immigrants and refugees7 in the same way as did 
the other Balkan nations—namely, to populate deserted or economically important 
areas, or to change the ethnic composition of the population of certain areas in or-
der to create an overwhelming Bulgarian majority, especially in precarious border 
areas. Refugees from Eastern Thrace and Macedonia were particularly encouraged 
to settle in Western Thrace, where there was a considerable presence of Greeks, 
Turks, and Pomaks: the last, though Bulgarian-speaking, were also distrusted. As 
has already been mentioned, this settlement policy was successful, because refugees 
preferred to look for shelter in areas adjacent to those they were expelled from (an-
ticipating an opportunity to return) and because there were plenty of houses, emp-
tied by Greeks and Turks expelled by the Bulgarians. Here, the territorial interests 
of Bulgaria coincided with concern for the everyday necessities of the refugees. 
However, an additional reason for Bulgarian refugees to settle in Western Thrace 
seems to have been that in this newly-acquired area, the power of the corrupted 
Bulgarian administration was apparently less oppressive (Grebenarov 2006, p. 41).
The refugees were also used as an argument for Bulgaria’s irredentist claims at 
the 1919–1920 Paris Peace Conference and later, at the ensuing conferences of San 
Remo and Lausanne in 1920 and 1923, respectively. Although Bulgaria belonged 
to the camp of the defeated and could harbour few illusions about the generosity of 
the victors, its ambitions were considerable: Bulgaria claimed not only the whole 
of Macedonia and Western Thrace, but also Eastern Thrace up to the line of Enez-
Midye (Kosatev 1996, p. 62). The Ottoman Empire, which had not survived World 
War I, must have looked to the Bulgarians a defenceless prey. As long as no final 
decisions on new borders were made, the refugees were mobilized to support these 
claims.
Of course, the refugees were not only a tool in international politics, but also a 
heavy financial and social burden. Providing urgent humanitarian aid to the refu-
gees required resources that Bulgaria did not possess; certainly it was unable to 
properly shelter the refugees and offer them jobs within a short span of time. Most 
refugees were poor, as they had been able to take with them only a small proportion 
of their belongings, and were in great need of aid. Most of them were peasants, but 
arable land was scarce in Bulgaria. While the Bulgarian authorities did their best 
to help the refugees, they did not hurry to settle them definitively, as this could 
have produced the impression that Bulgaria was prepared to accept the territorial 
7 Properly speaking, Bulgarians and Greeks who left their native lands for Bulgaria and Greece 
respectively, as a result of the Treaty of Neuilly, were not refugees but emigrants, as the popula-
tion exchange was ‘voluntary’ in principle. Indeed, many Bulgarians did not leave, especially in 
Western Macedonia; similarly for many Greeks in the coastal cities in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, in 
most cases, emigration had a compulsory character, which justifies to some extent the use of the 
term ‘refugees’. However, we use the term here without the dramatizing and mythologizing con-
notations that the words ‘prosfiyes’ and ‘bežanci’ have in Greek and Bulgarian.
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curtailing and that the refugees would never return to their homes. Actually, the 
refugees themselves wished to return, and this would also have relieved the Bul-
garian state budget and served the aim of continuing the presence of a Bulgarian 
population in the claimed territories.
3.4  Refugees Serving State Interests
Three main concerns—providing humanitarian aid to the refugees, securing their 
return to their native countries and contributing to the realization of the territo-
rial ambitions—were dealt with by the post-war Bulgarian governments in close 
collaboration with the refugees’ organizations. The refugees from Macedonia and 
Eastern Thrace had already united in 1912 in ‘brotherhoods’ ( bratstva), organized 
on the basis of the places of origin of their members. These brotherhoods had elect-
ed a common Executive Committee (EC), with Aleksandăr Protogerov, the leader 
of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), as chair. The EC 
wholeheartedly supported the policy of the Bulgarian government. After the Bul-
garian invasion in the Serbian-annexed part of Macedonia in October 1915, the EC 
provided intelligence to the Bulgarian military. Members of the brotherhoods were 
offered important functions in the army and the civil administration in the occupied 
regions (Grebenarov 2006, p. 21). The brotherhoods themselves became superflu-
ous as soon as the refugees were allowed to return to their native lands.
One month after the defeat of Bulgaria at the Macedonian front, the brotherhoods 
were re-established. During their first meeting in mid-October 1918, they elected a 
delegation which was to present the concerns of the refugees to the Peace Confer-
ence in Paris. (Such a delegation was not and would not be invited; it could only 
have informal meetings.) The standpoints that the delegation had to defend were 
also discussed. It was decided that the delegation would plead for the unification 
of Macedonia with Bulgaria and for preservation of Western Thrace as a part of the 
Bulgarian state. If this turned out to be unachievable (as it soon did), the delegation 
would demand preservation of the territorial integrity of Macedonia, as a protector-
ate of the Entente Powers or the League of Nations (Grebenarov 2006, pp. 22–46). 
In the very worst case, the delegation would beg for continuation of the mandate of 
the Entente Forces in Western Thrace, with strong guarantees that the area would be 
transferred neither to Greece nor to Turkey (Kosatev 1996, pp. 82–83).
The constituent conference of the Union of Macedonian Brotherhoods (UMB), 
which was to elect a new EC, on 22 November 1918, is illustrative of the way the 
organization and the Bulgarian state cooperated. The chair of the former EC, Pro-
togerov, was not a candidate for the chairmanship of the UMB. As the leader of the 
IMRO, he preferred to have his hands free to proceed to violent actions if necessary, 
without compromising the Bulgarian government, which tried hard to soften the 
standpoints of Athens and Belgrade (Grebenarov 2006, p. 27).8 Palešutski believed 
8 In Serbia, Protogerov had been indicted as a war criminal, which rendered him an inappropriate 
representative of the Macedonian refugees at the Peace Conference in Paris.
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that ‘the quick creation of the EC immediately after the defeat at the southern Front 
in September 1918 was due to one single reason—the attempt of the Bulgarian 
state policy to link at any price the cause of the Bulgarian Macedonians with that of 
Bulgaria’ (Palešutski 1993, p. 12). The government obviously used the organization 
for its own aims. Although at the conference in October 1918 brotherhoods of all 
political tendencies were invited, the government was reluctant to cooperate with 
the so-called ‘Group of Serres’, consisting of supporters of the late Jane Sandanski, 
which was quite influential in Serres, Thessaloniki, and Strumica. The ‘Group of 
Serres’ was in favour of an independent multi-ethnic Macedonian state, organized 
as a federation after the Swiss model. It enjoyed the support of a considerable num-
ber of refugees, but understandably the government, aiming at the annexation of 
Macedonia, was less enthusiastic. In addition, the group’s eagerness to resort to vio-
lent action if the demands were not met, did not fit in with the cautious diplomacy 
of the government (Grebenarov 2006, pp. 25–26).
In October 1918, the government also established a Commission for the Hous-
ing, Feeding, and Distribution of the Refugees from Macedonia and the Region of 
the Morava River (eastern Serbia), answerable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Emil Sprostranov, Secretary of the UMB, was elected chair of the Commission. 
However, the Commission apparently was responsible in the first place for the pay-
ment of salaries to teachers and priests in Vardar Macedonia, and of agents sent out 
to gather information about cases of maltreatment of the local Bulgarian popula-
tion and movements of the Entente armies. Again, the interests of the state seem to 
have weighed more than the fate of the refugees. In December 1918, a liquidation 
commission was founded, accountable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
Ministry of Public Health Services. This commission offered immediate humanitar-
ian aid to the refugees and helped them ‘return to their homes’ (Grebenarov 2006, 
pp. 33–34). However, since all these commissions and organizations (including the 
IMRO) worked closely together, obtaining urgent humanitarian aid—and eventually 
housing and arable land—greatly depended on whether the claimant supported the 
(radical) political standpoints of these organizations (Dragostinova 2006, p. 563).
By the end of December 1918, a conference of the UMB approved of the func-
tioning of the EC and proclaimed the UMB as the only body representing ‘the le-
gal Macedonian cause in Bulgaria’—an implicit refutation of the standpoint of the 
‘Group of Serres’. Discussing the position of the UMB vis-à-vis the Bulgarian gov-
ernment, the conference gave total freedom to the leadership as far as fund-raising 
was concerned (Grebenarov 2006, pp. 34–35). As the Bulgarian state was the main 
sponsor of the UMB, the organization in practice soon became financially depen-
dent on the government and was obliged to support state policy. One should keep in 
mind, however, that state policy greatly reflected Bulgarian public opinion insofar 
as the Bulgarian claims on Macedonia and Western Thrace were concerned.
When it became obvious that the Paris Peace Conference was not inclined to 
meet the requests of the Bulgarian negotiators, the Bulgarian claims were adjusted. 
The government insisted on the incorporation of Macedonia and Western Thrace 
into Bulgaria, finally anchoring its last hope on the Fourteen Points of President 
Woodrow Wilson which proclaimed that state borders should be drawn as much as 
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possible along lines of nationality. However, in early 1919 at a new meeting of the 
UMB, the incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgaria was no longer explicitly men-
tioned; the ‘indivisibility’ ( nedelimost) of Macedonia was instead emphasized. This 
compromise represented a move towards the standpoint of the ‘Group of Serres’, 
increasingly shared by the IMRO (Palešutski 1993, pp. 19–24). The idea of an au-
tonomous Macedonia enjoyed growing popularity among the refugees, who were 
disappointed about the poor—if any—results achieved by the government and the 
EC of the UMB (Grebenarov 2006, p. 40). Incongruities between the government 
and the IMRO—with the UBM split in between—increased; this worsened as the 
IMRO drew closer to the communists, who were in favour of a federal solution to 
the national problems in the Balkans, with Macedonia as a separate federal unit. 
Their paths ultimately separated after the ‘unjust’ and ‘humiliating’ Treaty of Neuil-
ly, which was entirely blamed on the government.
As the Treaty Conference had postponed a final decision on Western Thrace, 
the Bulgarian government concentrated on re-including the area within the borders 
of the Bulgarian state. Prime Minister Teodor Todorov, the leader of the Bulgarian 
delegation to the peace conference, transmitted to Georges Clemenceau, its host, 
a petition with the signatures of 31,176 family heads from Western Thrace, who 
demanded in the name of 166,650 Bulgarians the right to return to their native land 
and to live a peaceful life ‘as Bulgarians’ (Kosatev 1996, p. 69). This would have 
been possible only if Western Thrace was not transferred to Greece or Turkey. In 
either of these cases, the Bulgarian population would have been forcibly expelled 
or ‘encouraged’ to leave through administrative harassment. The Bulgarians pro-
ceeded the same way with the minorities on their own territory. Particularly ironical 
was the declaration of the representative of the Bulgarian Muslims in the Bulgarian 
parliament, Šefik bej Šefket Beëv, who recommended that Western Thrace be as-
signed to Bulgaria since ‘currently, in Greece, there was no one left of the hundreds 
of thousands of Muslims who used to live within the old borders of the kingdom’ 
(Kosatev 1996, p. 68). In 1913, Bulgaria itself had expelled most of its Turkish 
population and launched a campaign to forcibly convert the Bulgarian (speaking) 
Muslims (Pomaks) to Christianity ( Report 1914, pp. 155–158). But the Bulgarian 
efforts were to no avail. The Entente Forces, which were in charge of administrating 
Western Thrace, in 1920 entrusted this task to Greek officials, who pressured the 
Bulgarians to leave.
3.5  The Last Options: Minority Rights
Finally, Bulgaria could do no more than insist on minority rights for those Bulgar-
ians who had remained, and press for fair financial compensation for the property 
the refugees had lost. Here, too, Bulgaria failed. Minority rights were not respected 
in Greece or in Yugoslavia. Greece preferred the Bulgarians to leave the country 
and was not prepared to offer them rights which would only encourage them to stay. 
Moreover, it needed the emptied houses and abandoned lands to shelter and feed 
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the Greek refugees from Asia Minor. Greece even put pressure on the Greeks in 
Bulgaria to settle in Greece, not only to ‘save’ them for the Greek nation, but appar-
ently also to avoid the bothersome demands of a reciprocal treatment of minorities 
(Dragostinova 2009, p. 192). Greece focused on building a Greek nation within the 
borders of the Greek state and in most cases seemed to reluctantly accept the loss 
of its ‘lost fatherlands’ ( chamenes patrides), at least in Bulgaria and Turkey. What 
probably also played a role there was that Greece had no significant co-ethnic popu-
lations living in the areas bordering Bulgaria who could support possible claims. 
The 1924 Kalfov-Politis Agreement, providing among other things for schooling in 
the native language—the local Slav dialect, to be sure, not standard Bulgarian—was 
cancelled after the Greek parliament refused to ratify it. This resulted ultimately 
in another massive emigration of Bulgarians and Greeks to Bulgaria and Greece, 
respectively.
In 1923, the clauses on financial compensation for the refugees, provided in the 
Convention added to the Treaty of Neuilly, were extended to the property rights of 
the refugees from Eastern Thrace; however, the 1927 Mollov-Kafandaris Agree-
ment on the practicalities, which resulted in a new, last wave of emigrants to Bul-
garia, was extinguished in 1931, when Greece discontinued the payments. The 1925 
Ankara Agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey stipulated that all Bulgarian es-
tates on Turkish territory became the property of the Turkish state.
Bulgaria’s insistence on its neighbours’ respecting Bulgarian minority rights was 
without a doubt inspired by the intention of ameliorating the living conditions of 
the minority. In addition, it could help to prevent Bulgaria from having to cope with 
the financial burden of even more immigrants. However, it was also part of an ir-
redentist policy, as Bulgaria’s territorial claims were justified only as long as there 
was a Bulgarian population living there (Dragostinova 2009, pp. 186–187, 192). 
Emigrating to Bulgaria was considered an expression of Bulgarian consciousness; 
staying could also be such.
3.6  Keeping the Torch Burning
After the conclusion of the Treaty of Neuilly, attitudes towards refugees in Bulgaria 
somehow changed. Although the refugees continued to long for their lost native 
lands and Bulgaria did not accept the ‘dictate’ of Neuilly, Bulgarian governments 
adopted a more pragmatic approach to the problems. The Agrarian Union (AU) 
cabinets (1920–1923) under Aleksandăr Stambolijski took a number of well-inten-
tioned but rather chaotic measures to provide the refugees with arable land. The idea 
that the refugees were potential AU voters might have been behind these measures 
as well. After a coup d’état ended the AU administration on 9 June 1923, the Na-
tional Alliance cabinets under Aleksandăr Cankov (1923–1926) and Andrej Ljapčev 
(1926–1931) continued this same policy. Moreover, Ljapčev succeeded in obtaining 
an international loan to cope with the financial problems that the influx of refugees 
had caused. In general, Bulgarian historians consider the refugees’ integration into 
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Bulgarian society as a success story. To some extent it was, given the enormous 
political, economic, and social problems that Bulgaria faced even without the refu-
gees. The usual explanation is the patriotic satisfaction that the refugees experi-
enced living in their own nation state and enjoying the hospitality of their fellow 
citizens (see, e.g., Dimitrov 1985). Dragostinova’s (2009, pp. 198–202) assessment 
is more down-to-earth. Many Bulgarians—and, for that matter, Greeks—preferred 
to stay in their native lands and preserve their houses and fields without prioritizing 
their ‘national identity’. Their new environments often regarded them as a threat. 
The image of the refugees grateful to settle in their ‘own fatherland’ and being 
brotherly welcomed by their co-nationals can be found in official discourses, but is 
in fact a nationalistic reduction of the many painful and contradictory emotions in-
evitably involved in compelled emigration. Briefly, the settlement of the Bulgarian 
refugees in Bulgaria caused the same problems as Karakasidou (1997) describes in 
her account of the fate of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor in Macedonia.
After Neuilly, Bulgaria attempted to normalize its relations with neighbouring 
states. This was cumbersome and risky, as the IMRO had resumed not only its ter-
rorist actions in Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia, but also its assaults on Bulgarian 
politicians who displayed insufficient determination concerning the ‘Macedonian 
question’. In June 1923, Stambolijski was killed by an IMRO squad. As members 
of the IMRO occupied powerful positions in the organizations providing aid and 
distributing houses and land to the refugees, the latter had no choice but to support, 
at least verbally, the IMRO policy and exploits, although—as already noted—they 
were probably more interested in improvement of their everyday living conditions 
(Dragostinova 2006, p. 563).
Stambolijski’s successor, Cankov, who considered himself a nationalist and was 
thoroughly convinced of the righteousness of Bulgaria’s claims on Macedonia and 
Thrace, describes in his memoirs how he tried to convince the IMRO leaders that 
violence in the given circumstances was inappropriate:
The Bulgarian people and the numerous Macedonian migrants in Sofia and the rest of 
Bulgaria could not help grieving about Macedonia, we could not forget her, the sufferings 
were immeasurable. But every reasonable man could understand that the old means of 
revolutionary struggle were not only outdated, but also dangerous. There was a common 
awareness that we should by no means provoke Yugoslavia, that means Serbia. From Mace-
donia itself a cry was given out against the squads which somehow continued to cross the 
border: ‘Leave us alone; we are Bulgarians, but do not provoke the authorities lest they kill 
defenceless people’. (Cankov n.d., p. 308)
However, the Bulgarian authorities did not try too hard to stop the activities of these 
squads, recruited mainly among the refugees. The IMRO was disbanded only in 
1934– with an ease which suggests that the Bulgarian state had indeed tolerated 
its activities (Dragostinova 2006, p. 556). The Bulgarian governments, acting very 
cautiously on the international scene, took very few measures to make the refugees 
accept their fate and stop dreaming about returning to their native lands. Obviously, 
this was intentional. Politicians almost overtly kept the torch of irredentism burn-
ing. Bulgaria’s neighbours were well aware of this covert agitation (Dragostinova 
2009, p. 195).
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Dimităr Hadžidimov (1875–1924), member of the ‘Group of Serres’ who joined 
the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1919 and in 1924 became a member of parlia-
ment, addressed the National Assembly as follows:
A complete and final solution to the refugees question will be achieved only when there are 
no refugees any more, when all or at least a majority of them will have the opportunity to 
freely return to their liberated countries, when they stop to be outcasts, when they escape 
once for ever their outcasts’ fate. It should be proclaimed and emphasized here, that, how 
badly the refugees in Bulgaria may be in need of a livelihood, of housing, of land and of 
means to exercise their crafts, in their hearts and souls never extinguishes and never will 
extinguish the burning desire to return to their hearths and homes. This ideal of them rises 
above all other worries they have as refugees, that means, their hope and belief that tomor-
row or after tomorrow freedom will glow above their enslaved country represents the most 
precious in their refugees’ souls. (Dimov 1924, pp. 9–10)
As Dragostinova (2006, p. 562) remarks, ‘[t]he leaders pursued radical solutions to 
the national question, and as a result they framed the public debate in exclusively 
nationalist terms and served as brokers of nationalist ideology among the refugees 
and within broader society’.
By the end of the 1930s, when the political situation in Europe seemed to of-
fer new opportunities for an irredentist policy, the refugees were among the most 
ardent supporters of Bulgarian revisionism. In 1940, on the verge of the Bulgarian 
occupation—or liberation, depending on the point of view—of Western Thrace one 
year later, Anastas Razbojnikov concluded his brief monograph on the ‘de-Bulgar-
ization of Western Thrace’ by summing up the various elements of Bulgarian irre-
dentism—the suffering and heroism of the people, the transformation of the ethnic 
composition of the Thracian population, and the pursuit of the natural resources of 
the region—and predicting the imminent ‘liberation’ of the area by Bulgaria. Obvi-
ously, none of the considerations or emotions of the immediate post-World War I 
period had faded:
I know that many youngsters from Western Thrace, who have grown up now, will think that 
the sufferings they underwent during their childhood are described here only insipidly; they 
will remember their lost parents and maybe will discover themselves and their dear ones on 
one of the scarce preserved photographs.
Of course, the sufferings and the expulsion of the Western Thracians deserve a more elabo-
rated and complete investigation. Probably this will be done in the future. Maybe one of 
our writers will find in these sufferings—and in the displayed heroism—rich material for 
a precious work of art.
During the administration of General Scharpe, the Bulgarian population having fled already 
in considerable numbers, Western Thrace became a scarcely populated area; there were 
hardly 24.4 people per square kilometre. And her resources are so abundant!
How many people live now in Western Thrace? Where do they come from? We know very 
well that her current Christian population is foreign to her and she herself is also foreign to 
the Greeks from the Caucasus and Asia Minor who have settled there.
For nearly twenty years a black veil has covered Western Thrace. The settlers there await 
foreigners… They have never slept quietly. Their eyes are constantly staring to the north, 
where the curtain will be left and her people will enter in their native land. Really, the end 
of the all-Bulgarian tragedy is near. (Razbojnikov 1998, pp. 129–130)
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3.7  Conclusion
During, and in the aftermath of, the Balkan Wars and World War I (that is, 1912–
1927), Bulgaria’s handling of its refugees and immigrants originating from neigh-
bouring countries was essentially no different from the way Greece dealt with its 
refugees from Bulgaria and Turkey. First of all, they were considered to be martyrs 
for the cause of the nation and were cared for insofar as the difficult economic and 
social circumstances allowed. At the same time, they were involved in the ambi-
tious project of building an ethno-culturally homogeneous nation. With their pres-
ence, they populated depopulated areas, homogenized ethnically mixed areas and 
served as a labour force. Bulgaria, though, pursued yet another policy.
Bulgaria was defeated twice. At the end of the Balkan Wars, it acquired much 
less territory than it had claimed; after World War I, instead of undoing what 
it considered to be an injustice, it had to cede parts of its already ‘incomplete’ 
territory to Greece and Yugoslavia. These two defeats and their unhappy conse-
quences rendered Bulgaria a deeply frustrated country, eager to revise the ‘dic-
tates’ that had been imposed on it. During the peace negotiations in Paris, Bul-
garia ‘used’ the refugees to support its claims to the lost territories (Macedonia, 
Eastern Thrace) and to prevent the secession of areas claimed by its neighbours 
(mainly Western Thrace). It insisted on the return of the refugees—that was what 
the refugees themselves wished as well—or the right of the Bulgarian minorities 
to remain in their native lands. These demands, though supported by humanitar-
ian considerations, equally served irredentist goals: a return of the refugees would 
increase the number of Bulgarians and actually justify the territorial claims. For 
that same reason, they were totally unrealistic. The refugees’ organizations, ini-
tially created with the aim of providing humanitarian aid, were brought into play 
to defend the Bulgarian territorial claims abroad, although many refugees, appar-
ently, were satisfied with solutions that enabled them to save their property rather 
than their national identity. Only when the territorial ambitions finally turned out 
to be unrealizable were measures taken to settle the refugees on a permanent basis 
and to provide them with housing and land. Subsequently, however, despite most 
Bulgarian governments’ pragmatic foreign policy, aimed at normalizing relations 
with neighbouring countries, political leaders (often in opposition to the govern-
ment) exploited the refugees’ understandable frustrations to sustain a revanchist 
and revisionist mood among them and in Bulgarian society in general. By the end 
of the 1930s, when the political circumstances in Europe had radically changed 
as a result of the ascent of Nazi Germany, the Bulgarians were still hoping for a 
new chance to regain the claimed territories and for the refugees—or their chil-
dren—to resettle in their lost homelands. However, many of them were to become 
refugees yet again—after World War II.
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